The Basics of the Killing Machine


     The founding fathers of the American nation could not imagine that what they were proclaiming at that time, as any other historical society, was carrying within it the seeds of its own transformation.

     The attractive Declaration of Independence of 1776, which celebrated its 231st birthday last Wednesday, stated something which in one way or another captivated many of us:  “We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.  That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.  That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter it or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

     It was the result of the influence of the best minds and philosophers of a Europe overwhelmed by feudalism, the privileges of the aristocracy and absolute monarchies.


     Jean-Jacques Rousseau stated in his famous Social Contract: “The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty.” (…) “Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have.  To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will…” (…)  “To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of Humanity and even its duties.  For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible.”

     In the Thirteen Colonies that obtained their independence, there were also forms of slavery as atrocious as those in ancient times.  Men and women were sold at public auction.  The new nation emerged with its own religion and culture.  The Tea Tax was the spark that set off the rebellion.

     In those vast lands slavery continued for at least 100 years, and after two centuries, slave descendants are still feeling the consequences.  There were native communities which were the legitimate natural inhabitants, as well as forests, water, lakes, herds of millions of bison, natural species of animals and plants, abundant and various foods.  Hydrocarbons were unknown then, as was the enormous wasting of energy carried out by today’s society. 

Had the same declaration of principles been proclaimed in the countries crossed by the Sahara Desert, it would not have created a paradise for European immigrants.  Today we must speak about immigrants coming from the poor countries that cross, or try to cross, the U.S. borders by the millions each year in the quest for jobs, and are not entitled even to parental custody over their children if they are born on U.S. soil.


     The Philadelphia Declaration was written at a time when there were only small printing presses and letters took years to get from one country to another.  There were only a few people who could read and write.  Today, images, words and ideas travel in a fraction of a second from one corner to another in a globalized planet.  Conditioned reflexes are created in the minds of people.  We cannot speak about the right to use, but rather about the overuse of free expression and mass alienation.  Likewise, with modest electronic equipment, anybody, during peacetime, can send their ideas out into the world without any authorization from any Constitution.  It would be a battle of ideas; in any case, a mass of truths versus a mass of lies.

     Truths do not need commercial advertisements.  Nobody could disagree with the Philadelphia Declaration or with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract.  Both documents support the right to struggle against the established world tyranny.

     Could we ignore the pillaging wars and the slaughters which are forced upon the poor peoples who make up three-quarters of the planet?  No!  Those are typical of today’s world and of a system that could not sustain itself otherwise.  At an enormous political, economic and scientific cost, the human species is being pushed to the edge of an abyss.

     My aim is not to repeat concepts that I have mentioned in other reflections.  Based on simple events, my purpose is to carry on demonstrating the immense hypocrisy and the total lack of ethics which characterize the actions, chaotic by nature, of the government of the United States.


     In "The Killing Machine”, published last Sunday, I said that it was through one of the declassified CIA documents that we found out about the attempt to poison me using an official of the Cuban government with access to my office.  It dealt with a person about whom I should have sought out some information, since I didn't have the elements on hand to make the necessary judgement.  In fact, I offered my apologies if I was hurting the feelings of any descendants, whether or not the concerned person were guilty.  I later continued to analyze other important subjects in the CIA revelations.

          During the early days of the Revolution, I used to visit, almost on a daily basis, the recently created National Institute of Agrarian Reform, located where today we have the headquarters of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.  We were not able to use the Palace of the Revolution yet, since that was the venue of the Palace of Justice at that time.  Its construction resulted from juicy business deals made by the overthrown regime.  The main profit came from the increased value of real estate lands, from which thousands of people had been evicted.  As a recently graduated lawyer, I worked pro bono as the attorney for the defense of those people, months before Batista’s coup d'état.

     From the offices of INRA, on March 4, 1960, I heard an ear-splitting explosion of La Coubre and I watched a dark column of smoke rising above the port of Havana.  What came to my mind immediately was the thought of a ship loaded with anti-tank and anti-personal grenades that could be used in the FAL rifles we had acquired from Belgium, a country far from being suspected of being Communist.  Right away I went down to go to that location.  On my way there, because of the noise and the vehicle’s vibrations, I could not hear the second explosion.  More than 100 people died and dozens were maimed.  At the funeral for the victims, the cry of “Homeland or Death” (Patria o Muerte) was spontaneously born.

     We know that everything was carefully planned by the Central Intelligence Agency right from the port where the ship was loaded.  The ship had passed through the ports of Le Havre, Hamburg and Antwerp.  The grenades were loaded at the last of these, in Belgium.  The explosions on the ship also killed several of the French crew. 

     Why, in the name of freedom of information, do they not declassify a single document that will tell us how the CIA, almost half a century ago, exploded the steamship La Coubre and cut off the supply of Belgian weapons which, as the CIA itself admitted on June 14, 1960, was a very important concern for the United States?

What was I devoting my time to during the feverish days previous to the attack through Bay of Pigs?

     The first large-scale clean-up in the Escambray Mountains took place during the last months of 1960 up until early in 1961.  More than 50 thousand men took part, almost all of them coming from the former provinces of Havana and Las Villas.

     A flood of weapons was arriving in ships from the USSR. These were not exploding in ports.  It was useless to try to buy them elsewhere, and thus we avoided the pretext that the United States used to attack Guatemala, which eventually cost more than one hundred thousand Guatemalan people dead or missing.


     In Czechoslovakia we bought light weapons and a number of 20 mm and double-barrelled anti-aircraft guns.  The tanks with 85 mm cannons, 100 mm armored artillery, 75 mm antitank cannon, mortars, howitzers and large caliber cannon up to 122 mm, and light and heavy anti-aircraft, all came directly from the USSR.

     It would have taken at least a year to train by traditional methods the personnel needed to use all that weaponry.  We did it in a matter of weeks.  We dedicated practically one hundred percent of our time to that task almost two years after the triumph of the Revolution.

    We were aware of an imminent attack, but didn’t know when or how it would come.  All possible access points were being defended or guarded.  The leaders all had their headquarters:  Raúl in Oriente, Almeida in the center, and Che in Pinar del Río.  I was headquartered in the capital:  a former bourgeois residence had been adapted for that purpose on the highest right bank of the Almendares River, close to the point where the river flows into the sea.

     It was already daylight on April 15, 1961, and there I was, since the first early morning hours, receiving news from Oriente, when a ship had come from the southern United States, skippered by Nino Díaz, with a group of counterrevolutionaries on board dressed in olive green fatigues similar to the ones worn by our troops, ready to land in the Baracoa area.  This was to create a diversion far from the exact site of the main attack, in order to create maximum confusion.  The ship was already at the crosshairs of the antitank cannons, but in the end the landing did not take place.


            On the night of the 14th, we also got news that one of our three jet fighters, which were training craft ready for engagement, had blown up during a reconnaissance flight over the area of presumptive landing.  This was undoubtedly a Yankee action perpetrated from the Guantánamo Naval Base or somewhere else in the sea or the air.  There was no radar to exactly pinpoint the event. The outstanding revolutionary pilot, Orestes Acosta, died in that action.

     From the headquarters I mentioned, I could see the B-26s flying low over the spot and, a few seconds later, I heard the first missiles launched without warning against our young artillery, who for the most part were being trained at the Ciudad Libertad Air Base.  The response of those brave men was practically instantaneous.

     Besides, I have no doubt whatsoever that Juan Orta was a traitor.  The pertinent details about his life and conduct are where they ought to be: in the archives of the Department of State Security, born in those years under enemy fire.  The most politically conscious men were the ones assigned that mission.

     Orta had received the poisoned pills which had been proposed to Maheu by Giancana.  Maheu’s conversation with Roselli, who would play the part of mob contact, took place on September 14, 1960, months before Kennedy’s election and inauguration.

     The traitor, Orta, had no special merits.  We kept writing each other when we were looking for the support of Cuban emigrants and exiles in the United States.  He was appreciated for his apparent training and helpful attitude.  That was where his special talent laid.  After the triumph of the Revolution, he had frequent access to me during an important period.  Based on his possibilities then, it was believed that he would be able to put the poison into a soft drink or a glass of orange juice. 

     He had received money from the mob supposedly for helping to reopen the gambling casinos.  He had nothing to do with this.  We were the ones who had made that decision.  Urrutia's unilateral order, issued without previous consultation, was creating chaos and promoting protests by thousands of workers in the tourist and business sectors, at a time when unemployment was running high.

            Some time later, the gambling casinos were shut down for good by the Revolution.

     When he was given the poison, contrary to what used to happen in the early days, Orta had very little possibilities to coincide with me.  I was fully involved in the activities I previously described. 

     Without saying a word to anybody about the enemy plans, on April 13th, 1961, two days before the attack on our air bases, Orta sought asylum at the Venezuelan Embassy which Rómulo Betancourt had placed at the unconditional service of Washington.  The numerous counterrevolutionaries seeking asylum there were not granted exit permits until the brutal armed aggression by the United States against Cuba let up.

     We already had to put up with the betrayal of Rafael del Pino Siero in Mexico.  After deserting a few days before our departure for Cuba, a date he wasn’t aware of, he sold to Batista for 30 thousand dollars some important secrets dealing with part of the weapons and the boat which would take us to Cuba.  With elegant cunning he divided up the information in order to gain confidence and to guarantee compliance with each part.  First, he would receive some thousands of dollars for delivering two weapons deposits that he knew about.  A week later, he would deliver the most important information:  the boat that was bringing us to Cuba and the landing site.  They would be able to capture us all along with the other weapons, but before that, they had to give him all of the money.  Some Yankee expert surely had advised him.

     Despite this betrayal, we left Mexico in the “Granma” on the set date.  Some of our supporters thought that Pino would never betray us, that his desertion was due to his dislike of discipline and the training I demanded of him.  I won’t say how I learned of the operation that had been hatched between him and Batista, but I learned about it with full precision, so we were able to take appropriate measures in order to protect personnel and weapons that were en route to Tuxpan, the launch site.  That valuable information didn’t cost a penny.

     When the final offensive by the tyranny in the Sierra Maestra had finished, we had to also fight against the bold tricks of Evaristo Venereo, an agent of the regime who, disguised as a revolutionary, tried to infiltrate the Movement in Mexico. He was the liaison with the secret police in that country, a very repressive body which he advised for the interrogation of Cándido González; this heroic militant was blindfolded during his interrogation and was assassinated after the landing.  He was one of the few comrades who drove the car I moved around in.

     Evaristo returned to Cuba later.  He was assigned the mission of assassinating me when our forces were advancing towards Santiago de Cuba, Holguín, Las Villas and the western part of Cuba.  We learned of the details when we took over the archives of the Military Intelligence Service.  These events are documented.

     I have survived numerous assassination plots.  Only luck and the habit of carefully observing every detail allowed all of us, Camilo, Che, Raúl, Almeida, Guillermo, who were later known as the leaders of a triumphant Revolution, to survive the trickery of Eutimio Guerra during the early and most dramatic days in the Sierra Maestra.  We might have possibly died when we were at the verge of being eliminated with a ridiculous siege laid on our camp by surprise under the traitor’s guidance. During the brief clash that ensued, we suffered a sad loss:  a wonderful, black sugar worker and active combatant, Julio Zenón Acosta, who moved ahead of me and fell at my side.  Others survived the deadly danger, and fell in combat afterwards, as was the case of Ciro Frías, an excellent comrade and promising leader, who died in Imías, in the Second Front; Ciro Redondo, who fiercely fought the enemy with the troops of Che’s column, and was killed in Marverde; and Julito Díaz, who was relentlessly shooting his caliber 30 machine gun and died a few steps from our Command Post at El Uvero battle.

We set up the ambush at a very well chosen spot, waiting for the enemy, because we were aware of the moves they intended to make that day.  Our attention slackened for a few minutes when two men from the group, who had been sent out as scouts before deciding to move, returned without news.

     Eutimio was guiding the enemy dressed in a white ‘guayabera’ shirt, the only thing visible in the Alto de Espinosa woods, where we were waiting for him.  Batista had the headlines ready about the elimination of the whole group, which was for him a sure thing, and had notified the press. Out of excessive confidence, we had in fact underestimated the enemy which was taking advantage of human weaknesses.  At that time, we were a group of about 22 well-seasoned and selected men.  Ramiro, wounded in one leg, was recovering at some distance from us.

          The column of more than 300 soldiers, who were advancing one abreast through the sheer and wooded landscape, was spared a storming blow, thanks to a last-minute move that we made.


How did that machine work in the face of the Cuban Revolution?


     As early as April of 1959, I visited the United States as a guest of the Washington Press Club.  Nixon deigned to have me visit him in his private office.  Later he said that I was inexperienced in the subject of economics. 

     I was so aware of this inexperience, that I enrolled in three university degree courses in order to qualify for a scholarship that would allow me to study Economics at Harvard.  I had already finished and had written the exams for all the Law, Diplomatic Law and Social Science courses.  I only had two subjects to be examined on:  History of Social Doctrines and History of Political Doctrines.  I had been studying them carefully.  That year, no other student was making the effort.  The path had been cleared, but events were on the fast track in Cuba and I understood that this was not the time to take a scholarship to go study Economics.


     I went to Harvard on a visit at the end of 1948.  As I returned to New York, I bought a copy of The Capital in English in order to study Marx’s most notable work and at the same time improve my command of that language. I was not “an underground Communist Party member” as Nixon, with his crafty and penetrating gaze, happened to think. If there is something I can be sure of, and I discovered it at the University, is that I was first a Utopian Communist and then a radical Socialist by virtue of my own analysis and studies, and was ready to fight with the proper strategies and tactics. 

     My only qualm about speaking with Nixon was the distaste I had in frankly explaining my philosophy to a Vice-president and a likely future President of the United States, an expert in imperialist economic concepts and governing methods, which I had ceased to believe in long ago.

     What was the gist of that meeting which took hours, according to the author of the declassified memo that refers to it?  I only have my own memories of what happened.  I have selected the paragraphs from this memo which, in my opinion, best explain Nixon’s ideas.


     “He (Castro) was particularly concerned about whether he might have irritated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard to him.  I reassured him at the beginning of the conversation that 'Meet the Press’ was one of the most difficult programs a public official could go to and that he had done extremely well – particularly having in mind the fact that he had the courage to go on in English rather than to speak through a translator.”


     “It was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United States was concerned that his primary interest was ‘not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion.”

     “It was this almost slavish subservience to prevailing majority opinion –the voice of the mob– rather than his naïve attitude towards Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even the most elementary economic principles which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he might eventually turn out to be.  That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the responsibility of a leader not always to follow public opinion (but to help to direct it in the proper channels,) not to give the people what they think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make them want what they ought to have.”

     “I in my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we believe in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights which a majority should never have the power to destroy.”

     “I frankly doubt that I made too much of an impression upon him but he did listen and appeared to be somewhat receptive.  I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms of how his place in history would be affected by the courage and statesmanship he displayed at this time.  I emphasized that the easy thing to do was to follow the mob, but that the right thing in the long run would be better for the people and, of course, better for him as well.  As I have already indicated he was incredibly naïve with regard to the Communist threat and appeared to have no fear whatever that the Communists might eventually come to power in Cuba.”

     “In our discussions of Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban people unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get into positions of power and influence.  On this score I feel I made very little impression, if any.”

     “I put as much emphasis as possible on the need for him to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.”

     “It was apparent that while he paid lip service to such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion that his primary concern was with developing programs for economic progress.  He said over and over that a man who worked in the sugar cane fields for three months a year and starved the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house and some clothing.”

     “He indicated that it was very foolish for the United States to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean country.  He said ‘anybody knows that our countries are not going to be able to play any part in the defense of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out.  The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution.  It would be far better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for capital investment.’  I will have to admit that as far as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I could disagree with!”


     “We had a rather extended discussion of how Cuba could get this investment capital it needed for economic progress.  He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what he wanted was not private capital but government capital.”

            I was referring to the capital owned by the Cuban government.

            Nixon himself acknowledged that I never asked for any resources from the U.S. government.  He got a little mixed up and said:

“… that government capital was limited because of the many demands upon it and the budget problems we presently confronted.”

It was evident I clarified him on that because right afterwards he pointed out in his memo:

“… that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go to a country where there was any considerable fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against private enterprise.”

     “Here again on this point I doubt if I made too much of an impression.”

     “I tried tactfully to suggest to Castro that Muñoz Marín had done a remarkable job in Puerto Rico in attracting private capital and in generally raising the standard of living of his people and that Castro might well send one of his top economic advisors to Puerto Rico to have a conference with Muñoz Marín.  He took a very dim view of this suggestion, pointing out that the Cuban people were ‘very nationalistic’ and would look with suspicion on any programs initiated in what they would consider to be a ‘colony’ of the United States.”


     “I am inclined to think that the real reason for his attitude is simply that he disagreed with Muñoz firm position as an advocate of private enterprise and does not want to get any advice which might divert him from his course of leading Cuba toward more socialism of its economy.”

     “You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa…”

     “I also tried to put our attitude toward communism in context by pointing out that Communism was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set up dictatorships.”

     “Significantly enough he did not raise any questions about the sugar quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with regard to economic assistance.”

     “My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men.  Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally.  He seems to be sincere, he is either incredibly naïve about Communism or under Communist discipline…”

     “But because he has the power to lead to which I have referred we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.”

            That was the end of his confidential memo to the White House.

            When Nixon started to talk, nothing could stop him. He was used to preaching Latin American presidents.  He did not prepare any drafts of what he intended to say or took notes of what he actually said.  He responded to questions that were never asked.  He dealt with subjects based only on the opinions he had about his interlocutor.  Not even an elementary school student would hope to receive so many lessons altogether on democracy, anti-Communism and other matters related to the art of governing.  He was fond of developed capitalism and its domain of the world out of its own natural right. He idealized the system.  He didn’t conceive otherwise, nor was there the slightest possibility of getting through to him.

     The killings began under the Eisenhower and Nixon governments.  There is no other way to explain why Kissinger exclaimed, and I quote, that “blood would flow if we knew, for example, that Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, had personally directed the assassination of Fidel Castro”.  Some blood had flown before.  What the former administrations did, with few exceptions, was to follow the same policy.

     In a memorandum dated on December 11, 1959, the head of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division, J.C. King, said, and I quote: “We must give thorough consideration to the elimination of Fidel Castro.  […]  Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the government…”

     As it was recognized by the CIA and the Church Senate Committee in 1975, the assassination plans sprang up in 1960, when the purpose of destroying the Cuban Revolution was included in the president’s agenda dated March that year.  The J.C. King memo was sent to Allen Dulles, the CIA Director, with a note that expressly requested approval for those and other measures.  They were all accepted and gladly welcomed, specially the proposal of assassination, as reflected by the following annotation in the document signed by Allen Dulles and dated one day after, on December 12: “The recommendation contained in Paragraph 3 is approved.”

          In a draft of a book that would contain a detailed analysis of declassified documents, written by Pedro Álvarez-Tabío, Director of the Historical Affairs Office of the Council of State, it is stated that: "Up to 1993, the Cuban State Security had discovered and neutralized a total of 627 conspiracies against the life of the Commander in Chief Fidel Castro.  This figure includes both the plans that reached some phase of concrete execution and those which were neutralized at an early stage, as well as other attempts that by various ways and for different reasons have been publicly revealed in the United States itself.  It does not include a number of cases that could not be verified, since the only available information was the testimony of some of the participants.  This of course did not include any of the plans plotted after 1993.”

            Previously, we were able to learn from the report by Colonel Jack Hawkins, CIA paramilitary chief during the preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion, that “the paramilitary General Staff studied the possibility of organizing an assault force of greater magnitude than the small contingency force planned earlier.”

     “It was thought that this force would be landed in Cuba after effective resistance activity, including active guerrilla forces had been developed. It should be noted that guerrilla forces were operating successfully in the Escambray mountains during this period.  It was visualized that the landing of the assault force, after widespread resistance activity had been created, would precipitate general uprisings and widespread defection among Castro's armed forces which could contribute materially to his overthrow."

     “The concept for employment of the force in the amphibious/airlift assault was discussed at meetings of the Special Group during November and December 1960.  The group took no definite position on ultimate employment of such a force but did not oppose its continued development for possible employment. President Eisenhower was briefed on the concept in late November of that year by CIA representatives.  He indicated that he desired vigorous continuation of all activities then in progress by all Departments concerned.”

            What did Hawkins report about the results of the covert operations program against Cuba from September 1960 to April 1961?

Nothing less than the following:


“a. Introduction of Paramilitary Agents.


Seventy trained paramilitary agents, including nineteen radio operators, were introduced into the target country.  Seventeen radio operators succeeded in establishing communication circuits with CIA headquarters, although a number were later captured or lost their equipment.”


“b. Air Supply Operations.


These operations were not successful.  Of 27 missions attempted, only four achieved desired results.  The Cuban pilots demonstrated early that they didn't have the required capabilities for this kind of operation.  A request for authority to use American contract pilots for these missions was denied by the Special Group, although authority to hire pilots for possible eventual use was granted."


“c. Sea Supply Operations.


These operations achieved considerable success. Boats plying between Miami and Cuba delivered over 40 tons of military arms, explosives and equipment, and infiltrated/exfiltrated a large number of personnel.  Some of the arms delivered were used for partially equipping a 400 man guerrilla force which operated for a considerable time in the Escambray, Las Villas Province.  Most of the acts of sabotage carried out in Havana and other sites used materials provided in this fashion."


“d. Development of Guerrilla Activity.


Agents introduced into Cuba succeeded in developing a widespread underground organization extending from Havana into all of the provinces.  However, there was no truly effective guerrilla activity anywhere in Cuba except in the Escambray Mountains, where an estimated 600 to one thousand ill-equipped guerrilla troops, organized in bands of 50 to 200 men, operated successfully for over six months […].  A CIA trained coordinator for action in the Escambray entered Cuba clandestinely and succeeded in reaching the guerrilla area, but he was promptly captured and executed. Other small guerrilla units operated at times in the provinces of Pinar del Río and Oriente, but they achieved no significant results.  Agents reported large numbers of unarmed men in all provinces who were wiling to participate in guerrilla activity if armed.”


“e. Sabotage.  


1) From October 1960 through April 15 1961 sabotage activity included the following:


     “(a) Approximately 300 thousand tons of sugar cane destroyed in 800 separate fires.”


     “(b) Approximately other 150 fires were set in 42 tobacco warehouses, two paper plants, a sugar refinery, two dairies, four stores, 21 Communist homes.”


     “(c)   Approximately 110 bombings, including Communist Party offices, Havana power station, two stores, railroad terminal, bus terminal, militia barracks, railroad train.”


     “(d)     Approximately 200 nuisance bombs in Havana Province.”


     “(e)   Derailment of 6 trains, destruction of a microwave cable and station, and destruction of numerous power transformers.”


     “(f)   A commando-type raid launched from the sea against Santiago, which put the refinery out of work for about one week.” 


     So much for what we have known thanks to the Hawkins’ report.  Anyone could understand that 200 bombs planted in the main province of an underdeveloped country which lived on the single crop farming of sugar cane, which is a semi-slave form of production, and on the sugar quota that had been earned for almost two centuries for being a guaranteed supplier, and whose major productive lands and sugar refineries belonged to large United States companies, constituted a brutal act of tyranny against the Cuban people.  Add to this all the other actions that were carried out. 

I will say no more.  It is enough for today.


Fidel Castro Ruz

July 7, 2007

Time: 3:00pm