REFLECTIONS BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
DELIBERATE LIES, STRANGE DEATHS AND AGRESSION TO THE WORLD ECONOMY
In one of
my reflections I made reference to gold bars deposited in the basements of the
a great scientist and humanist. He
example of the use of science and technology with the same hegemonic goals is
described in an article written by the former official of United States National
Security, Gus W. Weiss; it originally appeared in the magazine Studies in Intelligence, in 1996, even
though it was more widely distributed in 2002 under the title of Deceiving the Soviets. There, Weiss claims it was his idea to
send to the
According to notes taken from Chapter 17 of the book At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War, by Thomas C. Reed, former Secretary of the United States Air Force, Leonid Brezhnev told a group of senior Party officials in 1972: “We Communists have to string along with the capitalists for a while. We need their credits, their agriculture and their technology. But we are going to continue massive military programs, and by the mid-1980s we will be in a position to return to an aggressive foreign policy designed to gain the upper hand with the West.” This information was confirmed by the Defense Department in hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency in 1974.
In the early 1970s Nixon’s administration advanced the idea of détente. Henry Kissinger hoped that “over time, trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system”, he considered that détente might “invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political relations”.
tended to ignore Kissinger’s theories about détente and to take President
Brezhnev’s word, but all doubts were removed on
The dossier, under the name of Farewell, reached the CIA in August 1981. It made it quite clear that the Soviets had been spending years on research and development activities. Given the enormous transfer of technology by radar, computers, machine-tools and semi-conductors from the United States to the Soviet Union, one could say that the Pentagon was in an arms race with itself.
The Farewell Dossier also identified
hundreds of case officials, agents at their posts and other suppliers of
information through the West and
identifying agents, the most useful information brought by the Dossier consisted
of the “shopping list” and its aims in terms of acquisition of technology in
the coming years. When the Farewell
and transportation of oil and gas was one of the Soviet priorities. A new
trans-Siberian gas pipeline was to carry natural gas from the gas fields of Urengoi
In order to affect the dollar revenues coming in from the West and the domestic Russian economy, the software for the gas pipeline which was to operate the pumps, turbines and valves had been programmed to breakdown after a prudent interval and reset –that’s how it was described– the speeds of the pumps and the valve adjustments so that they would work at pressures much higher than those suitable for the pipeline’s gaskets and welding seams.
“The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space. At the White House, we received warning from our infrared satellites of some bizarre event out in the middle of Soviet nowhere. NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) feared a missile liftoff from a place where no rockets were known to be based. Or perhaps it was the detonation of a small nuclear device…They (the satellites) had detected no electromagnetic pulse, characteristic of nuclear detonations. Before these conflicting indicators could turn into an international crisis, Gus Weiss came down the hall to tell his fellow NSC staffers not to worry”, affirmed Thomas C. Reed in his book.
The campaign of countermeasures based on the Farewell Dossier was economic warfare. Even though there were no casualties in terms of lives lost from the gas pipeline explosion, significant damage was made to the Soviet economy.
As a grand finale, between 1984 and 1985, the United States and its NATO allies put an end to this operation which ended with efficacy the capacity of the USSR to capture technology at a time when Moscow was caught between a defective economy, on one side, and a US President determined to prevail and end the cold war on the other.
In the above cited article by Weiss, it is stated that:
“In 1985, the case took a bizarre turn when
information on the Farewell Dossier
Weiss is the one who claimed authorship, as already said, of the evil plan to
have the defective software taken to the
Before dying, he left some unpublished notes titled “The Farewell Dossier”: the strategic deception and the economic war in the Cold War.
for the government concentrated on matters of National Security, intelligence
organizations and concerns dealing with the transfer of technology to Communist
countries. He worked with the CIA, the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board and
with the Signals Intelligence Committee of the Intelligence Board of the
He was decorated with the CIA Medal of Merit and the “Cipher” Medal from the National Security Council. The French gave him the “Légion d’Honneur” in 1975.
He had no surviving relatives.
declared himself to be against the war in
recorded in already published documents that Mikhail Gorbachev became furious
when arrests and deportations of Soviet agents began in various countries, since he was unaware that the contents
of the Farewell Dossier were in the
hands of the main leaders of NATO governments. In a meeting of the Politburo on
final days of the
The White House pragmatists were also in the dark about these occurrences.
Reagan played his trump card: Star Wars/the
Strategic Defense Initiative. He knew that the Soviets could not compete in that
league, because they couldn’t suspect that their electronics industry was
infected with a virus, a Trojan horse placed there by the
The former British Prime Minister, in her memoirs, published by an important English publisher in 1993 under the title of Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, states that the whole Reagan plan related to Star Wars and the intent to make the Soviet Union collapse economically was the most brilliant plan of that administration, and it lead definitively to the collapse of socialism in Europe.
In Chapter XVI of her book, she explains the participation of her government in the Strategic Defense Initiative.
that out, in Thatcher’s opinion, was Reagan’s “most important decision”, and it
“was to prove central to the West’s victory in the Cold War”. It “imposed more
economic tension and greater austerity” on Soviet society, and finally, its
“technological and financial implications for the
Under the subtitle of “Reassessing the Soviet Union”, she describes a series of concepts whose essence is contained in the paragraphs taken literally from that long passage, where she records the brutal plot.
drew on, the Soviets must have begun to realize that their game of manipulation
and intimidation would soon be up.
European governments were not prepared to fall into the trap opened by
the Soviet proposal of a ’nuclear-free zone’ for
“…I had no doubt about the rightness of his commitment to press ahead with the program. Looking back, it is now clear to me that Ronald Reagan’s original decision on SDI was the single most important of his presidency”.
“In formulating our approach to SDI, there were four distinct elements which I bore in mind. The first was the science itself. The American aim in SDI was to develop a new and much more effective defense against ballistic missiles.”
“This concept of defense rested on the ability to attack incoming ballistic missiles at all stages of their flight, from the boost phase when the missile and all its warheads and decoys were together –the best moment– right up to the point of re-entry of the earth’s atmosphere on its way to the target.”
second element to be considered was the existing international agreements
limiting the deployment of weapons in space and ABM systems. The 1972 ABM Treaty, as amended by a 1974
Protocol, allowed the
Foreign Office of the Ministry of Defense always sought to urge the narrowest
possible interpretation, which the Americans --rightly in my view-- believed
would have meant that SDI was stillborn. I always tried to steer away from this
phraseology and made it clear in private and public that research on whether a
system was viable could not be said to have been completed until it had been
successfully tested. Underneath the jargon, this apparently technical point was
really a matter of straight common sense. But it was to become the issue
element in the calculation was the relative strength of the two sides in
Ballistic Missile Defense. Only the
“Also the Soviets were further advanced in anti-satellite weapons. There was, therefore, a strong argument that the Soviets had already acquired an unacceptable advantage in this whole area.
“The fourth element was the implications of SDI for deterrence. I started off with a good deal of sympathy for the thinking behind the ABM Treaty. This was the most sophisticated and effective the defense against nuclear missiles, the greater the pressure to seek hugely expensive advances in nuclear weapons technology. I was always a believer in a slightly qualified version of the doctrine known as MAD- ’mutually assured destruction’. The threat of (what I preferred to call) ‘unacceptable destruction' which would follow from a nuclear exchange was such that nuclear weapons were an effective deterrent against not just nuclear but also conventional war.”
soon began to see that SDI would strengthen not weaken the nuclear deterrent.
Unlike President Reagan and some other members of his Administration I never
believed that SDI could offer one hundred percent protection, but it would
the subject of SDI which dominated my talks with President Reagan and members
of his Administration when I went to
remarks made me nervous. I was horrified to think that the
heard, now that we got down to discussion of the likely reality rather than the
grand vision, was reassuring. President Reagan did not pretend that they yet
knew where the research could finally lead. But he emphasized that --in
addition to his earlier arguments in favor of SDI-- keeping up with the
“I now jotted down, while talking to National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane, the four points which seemed to me to be crucial.
“My officials then filled in the details. The President and I agreed on a text which set out the policy.
“The main section of my statement reads:
“I told the President of my firm conviction
that the SDI research programme should go ahead. Research is, of course,
permitted under existing US/Soviet treaties; and we, of course, know that the
Russians already have their research programme and, in the
“I subsequently learnt that George Schultz thought that I had secured too great a concession on the American’s part in the wording; but in fact it gave them and us a clear and defensible line and helped reassure the European members of NATO. A good day’s work.”
under the subtitle of “Visit to
following month (March 1985) saw the death of Mr. Chernenko and, with remarkably
little delay, the succession of Mr. Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership. Once
again I attended a
Gorbachev brought, as we had expected, a new style to the Soviet Government. He
spoke openly of the terrible state of the Soviet economy, though at this stage
he was still relying on the methods associated with Mr. Andropov’s drive for
greater efficiency rather than radical reform. An example of this was the
draconian measures he took against alcoholism. As the year wore on, however,
there was no evidence of improvement in conditions in the
distinct chill entered into
November President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev had their first meeting in
1986 Mr. Gorbachev showed great subtlety in playing on western public opinion
by bringing forward tempting, but unacceptable, proposals on arms control.
Relatively little was said by the Soviets on the link between SDI and cuts in
nuclear weapons. But they were given no reasons to believe that the Americans
were prepared to suspend or stop SDI research. Late in the year it was agreed
that President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev- with their Foreign Ministers- should
“It was that you could not ultimately hold back research on SDI any more than you could prevent research into new kinds of offensive weapons. We had to be the first to get it. Science is unstoppable; it will not be stopped for being ignored. “
“But then suddenly, at the very end, the trap was sprung. President Reagan had conceded that during the ten-year period both sides would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, though development and testing compatible with the Treaty would be allowed.”
But Reagan suffered a strange amnesia
about the triggering of the brutal military competition that had been forced on
“Sunday, July 19 (1981)
“The hotel is a marvelous piece of engineering, totally made up of logs.
“Had a one on one with Chancellor Schmidt. He was really down and in a pessimistic mood about the world.
“Following --met with Pres. Mitterrand-- explained our ec. program and that high interest rates were not of our doing.
“Dinner that night was just the 8 of us. The 7 heads of State and the Pres. (Thorn) of the European Community. It became a really free wheeling discussion of ec. issues, trade etc. due to a suggestion by P.M. Thatcher.”
The final result of the great conspiracy against the Soviet Union and the crazy expensive arms race that was imposed, when it was mortally wounded in an economic sense is described in the introduction of the book by Thomas C. Reed, written by George H. W. Bush, the first President in the Bush Dynasty, who participated in a very real way in World War II. Literally, he writes:
“The Cold War was a struggle for the very soul of the mankind. It was a struggle for a way of life defined by freedom on one side and repression on the other. Already I think we have forgotten what a long and arduous struggle it was, and how close to nuclear disaster we came a number of times. The fact that it did not happen is a testimony to the honorable men and women, both sides who kept their cool and did what was right—as they saw it—in times of crisis.”
“This conflict between the surviving superpowers of World War II began
as I came home from that war. In 1948, the year of my graduation from Yale, the
Soviets tried to cut off Western access to
was privileged to be President of the
took another two years to close down the empire of Lenin and Stalin. I
received that good news in two telephone calls. The first came on
weeks later a second call confirmed that the former
It is recorded in an article published in The New York Times that the operation used almost all of the weapons within the CIA's reach --psychological warfare, sabotage, economic warfare, strategic deception, counterintelligence, cybernetic warfare-- all collaborating with the National Security Council, the Pentagon and the FBI. It destroyed the burgeoning Soviet espionage machinery; it damaged the economy and destabilized the State in that country. It was a complete success. If the opposite had happened (the Soviets doing it to the Americans), it would have been viewed as an act of terrorism.
another book which deals with this topic; it is called Legacy of Ashes and it has just been published. On the book’s dust cover we can read that: Tim
Weiner is a reporter for The New York
Times. He has written on American intelligence for twenty years, and won the
Pulitzer Prize for his work on the secret national security programs. He has traveled to
Legacy of Ashes is based on more than 50
thousand documents basically coming from the CIA archives, and hundreds of
interviews with veterans of that agency, including ten directors. He reveals to
us a panorama of the CIA from the days of its creation after World War II,
going through its battles during the Cold War and the war against terrorism
The article by Jeremy Allison, published in Rebelión in June 2006, and the articles by Rosa Miriam Elizalde which were published this year on September 3 and 10, denounce these events emphasizing the idea of one of the founders of free software who pointed out that: “as technologies grow more complex, it will be more difficult to detect actions of this kind”.
Rosa Miriam published two straightforward opinion articles, each one only 5 pages in length. If she wants to, she could write a book with many pages. I remember her well from that day when, as a young journalist, she nervously asked me, during a press conference 15 years ago no less, whether I thought we could survive the Special Period that had befallen us with the demise of the Socialist bloc.
present day, the world is threatened by a devastating economic crisis. The
Fidel Castro Ruz